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ABSTRACT 
We employ a 2x3 factorial experiment to study two 
central factors in the design of prediction markets 
(PMs) for idea evaluation: the overall design of the 
PM, and the elasticity of market prices set by a 
market maker. The results show that ‘multi-market 
designs’ on which each contract is traded on a 
separate PM lead to significantly higher trading 
performance than ‘single-markets’ that handle all 
contracts one on PM. Price elasticity has no direct 
effect on trading performance, but a significant 
interaction effect with market design implies that the 
performance difference between the market designs 
is highest in settings of moderate price elasticity. We 
contribute to the emerging research stream of PM 
design through an unprecedented experiment which 
compares current market designs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The rise of Web 2.0 applications and online 
communities has empowered firms to tap into the 
creative potential and knowledge of millions of users. 
Concepts such as crowdsourcing (Howe, 2008), and 
open innovation (Chesbrough, 2003) ask for the 
active engagement of customers, employees, and 
suppliers in the innovation process. Open innovation 
(OI) communities have become quite popular. Users 
from all over the world engage in such platforms and 
generate numerous ideas, comments, and evaluations. 
While such online platforms ensure a large variety of 
ideas and solutions, they bear the problem of 
evaluating and selecting the best ideas. Various 
community-based, expert-based and jury-based 
evaluation and selection methods exist and are 
applied. However, the selection of the best ideas and 
prediction of success is still difficult and effortful. 
Developing precise forecasting tools is of crucial 
importance since inaccurate evaluation mechanisms 
imply the risk of selecting the wrong ideas. Lately, 
prediction markets (PMs) have been introduced as 
promising tool for collective evaluation tasks. While 
researchers have demonstrated the appropriateness of 
PMs during the innovation process, e.g. for the 
evaluation of new product ideas (Bothos et al., 2009, 
LaComb et al., 2007, Soukhoroukova et al., 2012), 
new product concepts (Dahan et al., 2010) and early 
stage technologies (Chen et al., 2009-10), uncertainty 
remains about how their design affects their 
predictive performance.  
 
The predictive performance of PMs depends on 
certain circumstances such as access to accurate 
information and to independent knowledge sources 
which may not hold true for PMs for idea evaluation 
as they have to deal with high uncertainty and little 
available information. In this domain, little is known 
about how the design of the applied PM affects its 
predictive performance, how it affects traders’ skills 
to cope with these conditions, and how the ideal PM 
configuration for idea evaluation may look like. In 
current research, different market designs are applied, 
i.e. ‘single-market designs’ which handle all idea 
contracts on a single market (e.g. Soukhoroukova et 
al., 2012, Gaspoz/Pigneur, 2008), or ‘multi-markets’ 
which set up a separate market for each idea (Bothos 
et al., 2009) but comparisons of relative performance 
lack. Additionally, current market makers such as 
Logarithmic Market Scoring Rules increase market 
accuracy (Hanson 2003) and allow to adjust their 
pricing algorithm such that elasticity of market prices 
changes. However, it is not yet clear how this market 
maker is applicable for idea evaluation and how 
changing price elasticity affects trading performance 
of users. Thus, the aim of this study is to gain a 
deeper understanding about the design of PMs for 
idea evaluation. In detail, we explore: 1) how the two 
different market designs affect trading performance 
of PM users and 2) how these effects are moderated 
by the elasticity of market prices. Answers to these 
questions shed light on predictive performance of PM 
for idea evaluation and provide help to configure 
accurate PMs for idea evaluation. The paper is 
structured as follows. After a short review of PMs, 
we present our research design. This is followed by 
the analysis and a discussion of results, contributions, 
limitations, and need for future research. 
RELATED WORK 
PMs are virtual market places on which users trade 
contracts that are bound to the occurrence of a future 
event and whose purpose is to collect, aggregate, and 
evaluate dispersed information (Wolfers/Zitzewitz, 
2004). The theoretical foundation of PMs is the 
efficient market hypothesis. According to Hayek 
(1945), market prices are the most efficient 
instrument to aggregate asymmetrically dispersed 
information. Thus, market prices in efficient markets 
can be used for forecasting as they reflect all 
available information (Fama, 1970). In PMs, traders 
buy contracts that have a certain payoff (e.g., $100) if 
a future events occurs. In the case that this event does 
not occur, contract holders receive no payoff. Hence, 
the market price reflects the probability that this 
event occurs, and traders can make profits if they 
correctly predict the event’s occurrence. PMs have 
successfully been used in the domains of politics, 
sports, and economics. Researchers also applied the 
concept to the evaluation of new product ideas 
(Soukhoroukova et al., 2012, LaComb et al., 2007), 
new product concepts (Dahan et al., 2010) and early 
stage technologies (Chen et al., 2009-10).  
 
On PMs, non-binary event spaces, i.e. a magnitude of 
idea contracts, have been implemented in two 
different ways. Most researchers set up a single 
market containing more than two tradable events 
(Soukhoroukova et al., 2012, Gaspoz/Pigneur, 2008), 
i.e., all contracts for all ideas are traded on one 
market. In these markets, traders are able to hold 
stocks in their portfolio of which they think the 
underlying event will occur at the market end (we 
call this ‘single-markets’). Contrary, it is also 
possible to set up a single market for each tradable 
event or idea (‘multi-markets’) (Bothos et al., 2009). 
In these markets, each idea is represented by two 
contracts that we call top-contracts (‘the idea will be 
the best idea on the market’) and flop-contracts (‘the 
idea will not be the best on the market’). These 
multiple markets are unified via a common user 
interface so that they appear as one market to the 
user. A similar effect can be realized with short-
selling functionalities on single-markets 
(Kamp/Koen, 2009, Wolfers/Zitzewitz, 2004). 
However, as most members of OI communities will 
rarely use PM they may lack sufficient knowledge on 
financial markets in order to apply this complex 
concept successfully (Blohm et al., 2011). 
 
A major concern of PMs are ‘thin markets’ in which 
information aggregation is ineffective due to 
insufficient traders (Hanson, 2003). Automatic 
market makers overcome this problem with 
algorithms that adjust prices based on the transactions 
of the traders. They give instant feedback to traders, 
as trades can be performed at any time without 
having to wait for a second trader as a counterparty 
(Pennock/Sami, 2008). Thus, market makers add 
infinite liquidity to PMs. Hanson’s (2003) 
Logarithmic Market Scoring Rules (LMSR) maker is 
currently the most applied market maker (Jian/Sami, 
2012, Slamka et al., 2012). As the LMSR market 
maker, most market makers apply some kind of 
mechanism for adjusting its pricing algorithm and its 
effective liquidity or price elasticity, that can be 
defined as the degree prices for a given contract 
change due to a single transaction. In this regard, the 
LMSR market maker applies an elasticity constant b, 
whose values can be chosen freely. 
RESEARCH MODEL AND HYPOTHESES  
Market and contract design are pivotal drivers of 
accuracy of PMs as it directly affects how dispersed 
information of multiple traders is aggregated by the 
market (Wolfers/Zitzewitz, 2004). However, the 
performance of PMs is not only influenced by how 
efficient the mechanism aggregates dispersed 
information, but is also driven by the trading 
decisions of its users. Appropriately designed PMs 
may help traders to distinguish more exactly between 
the single traits of the traded contracts, i.e. a better 
understanding of idea quality on PMs for idea 
evaluation, and to convey these judgments into more 
accurate trading decisions.  
 
We belief that multi-market designs enhance the 
trading performance of users on PMs for idea 
evaluation due to two reasons. Firstly, multi-markets 
could counter the negative effects of ‘favorite 
longshot biases’ (Snowberg/Wolfers, 2010). This bias 
occurs in betting and prediction markets as 
individuals tend to overbet longshots and underbet 
favorites. This effect has found to be robust and is 
grounded in cognitive errors in human information 
processing. Individuals cannot merely distinguish 
between small and tiny probabilities. As a result, both 
are priced similarly, therefore overpaying the smaller 
one. Further, people distrust very high probabilities 
leading to relative underevaluations 
(Snowberg/Wolfers, 2010). The LMSR market maker 
considers contract prices as probabilities of 
occurrence. Thus, market prices of all traded 
contracts equal 1. In OI communities, PMs have to 
cope with a big amount of ideas. Single-markets 
handle all these ideas on a unified market (with one 
market maker), whereas multi-markets employ a 
single market for every idea (with an own market 
maker each). Thus, single-market designs should 
create a higher amount of ‘penny stocks’ – idea 
contracts with very low prices. This bigger amount of 
low priced contracts on single-markets should 
decrease the ability of PM users to adequately judge 
idea quality. Secondly, and more importantly, multi-
markets should endow a better decision support for 
traders. Buying an idea contract on single-markets, 
users can bet on whether the given idea will be of 
higher quality than the other ideas on the market. On 
multi-markets traders can also sort out bad ideas by 
buying flop-contracts. Whereas top-contracts 
resemble the contracts traded on single-markets and 
might be appropriate for betting on high quality 
ideas, flop-contracts might appeal for ideas that users 
perceive as bad. Thus, flop-contracts help to reduce 
pricing errors as prices can actively be driven down 
(Kamp/Koen, 2009, Wolfers/Zitzewitz, 2004). 
Additionally, on single-markets every transaction 
affects market prices of all contracts as a single 
market maker is used. On multi-markets instead, a 
single transaction is only affected the prices of the 
traded contracts counterpart. Thus, users of single-
markets have to process more information that 
changes more dynamically. Cognitive load theory 
suggests that human information processing capacity 
is limited and information processing errors occur 
due to cognitive overload. Thus, these additional 
information processing demands may lead to 
situations of cognitive overload hampering the 
trader’s ability to make accurate trading decisions 
(Blohm et al., 2011). Thus, we assume:  
 
H1:  The market design influences the trading 
performance of users such that ‘multi-
markets’ lead to higher trading performance 
than ‘single-markets.’ 
 
Automatic market makers adjust prices on a given 
pricing algorithm. Existing research suggests that the 
efficiency of such market makers is a function of 
their price elasticity. If price elasticity is too low, 
prices of idea contracts hardly change and PMs 
behave very statically. As a consequence, market 
performance may drop as information exchange via 
the market mechanism is limited and not enough 
information can be collected, aggregated, and 
distributed via the market mechanism 
(Pennock/Sami, 2008). Thus, market prices in these 
markets are not efficient such that they cannot 
transfer private information from well informed to 
less informed traders (Hayek, 1945). By contrast, too 
high price elasticity creates highly volatile markets in 
which prices change very dynamically 
(Berg/Proebsting, 2009). High degrees of price 
elasticity create a more complex trading environment 
as more extreme situations in which high profits or 
losses can be generated will occur. Traders will have 
to process more information during the trading 
process making PM usage a more complex task. 
Thus, too high price elasticity might lead to situations 
of cognitive overload in which decision making 
quality of PM users decreases (Blohm et al., 2011). 
Thus, trading performance should follow an inverted 
u-shape as price elasticity increases. However, we 
believe that the effects of price elasticity on trading 
performance are conditional on the superordinate 
market design. If the market design is ill-fitted to the 
task at hand, the adjustment to an appropriate price 
elasticity of the market maker will have only a minor 
effect on trading performance. In H1 it was 
hypothesized that single-markets lead to a higher 
cognitive load than multi-markets as traders have to 
process more information that also changes more 
dynamically. Thus, the users of single-markets are 
generally more endangered by the risk of cognitive 
overload. If price elasticity increases, the cognitive 
load of prediction market usage should also rise as 
markets become more volatile. As cognitive load is 
an additive concept, users of single-markets should 
be more susceptible to cognitive overload than users 
of multi-markets. By contrast, users of multi-markets 
could initially benefit from increasing price elasticity 
as this market feedback supports them to make more 
accurate trading decisions. However, if market 
elasticity is too high, users of multi-markets will also 
reach a state of cognitive overload hampering their 
trading performance. Hence, we assume: 
 
H2: Price elasticity moderates the effect of 
market design on trading performance such 
that the difference in trading performance 
between ‘multi-markets’ and ‘single-
markets’ will be higher for moderate 
elasticity settings and smaller for low and 
high elasticity settings (inverted u-shape). 
 
Our research model is depicted in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: Research Model 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Experimental Task and Design 
In this study six PMs using Hanson’s (2003) LMSR 
market maker are compared. We employ a 2x3 
between subject factorial design with random 
assignment of 323 participants (cf. Table 1). The first 
factor was market design, where we implemented 
‘single-market’ and ‘multi-market’ designs. The 
second factor represented price elasticity, which we 
varied from low to medium to high. We tested three 
different price elasticity settings simulating a low 
(b=877; assuming 80 active traders), a moderate 
(b=548; assuming 60 active traders), and a high price 
elasticity on the market (b=219; assuming 40 active 
traders) in relation to the traders in each market. We 
used the approach of Berg/Proebsting (2009) to 
calculate the given degrees of price elasticity.  
 
 Price Elasticity 
high  moderate  low  
Market 
Design 
Single-Market N = 53 N = 64 N = 38 
Multi-Market N = 65 N = 54 N = 49 
Table 1: Research Design 
 
We used a standard portal for OI communities 
developed by the authors for the web experiment. 
Features, such as idea submissions, or commenting 
were disabled. Apart from the trading mechanisms all 
portals were identical. The portal consisted of a 
summary page containing the ideas to be traded, a 
portfolio page, and a FAQ explaining the 
experimental task as well as the PM’s way of 
functioning. The portfolio page contained financial 
information, such as transaction prices, liquid funds, 
and a graph representing a trader’s overall portfolio 
value. The participants used their own computers. 
Before starting the experiment, we confirmed 
whether all common web browsers displayed the PM 
correctly. As a web experiment closely reflects the 
actual usage scenario of OI communities, high 
external validity of our results can be assumed. 
Participants could trade the ideas in their natural 
environment and could allocate as much time to the 
task as desired. The internal validity of our results 
was enhanced by analyzing the log files of the PMs. 
By doing so, inappropriate user behavior, such as a 
random trading, could be identified. The forecasting 
goal was set to identify the best five ideas. Intensive 
pretesting revealed that the subjects perceived the 
task of identifying the best five ideas as considerably 
easier than identifying the best idea. On all markets 
participants received a capital of 5,000 virtual 
currency units. Participants received a payoff of 100 
virtual currency units for each idea contract in their 
portfolio that were correctly classified and 0 for 
incorrect classifications. 
Procedure 
Based on the random assignment, participants were 
invited via a personalized email that included a link 
with the respective system URL and an exhaustive 
description of the experimental task. Additionally, we 
provided all participants with a unique activation 
code that was necessary upon registration on the PM 
in order to prevent cross-contamination effects and 
manipulations through the creation of multiple user 
accounts. The trading period lasted three weeks in 
November 2010. After the experiment the 
participants completed a questionnaire. 
Participants 
Users of OI communities are predominantly male, 
young, and well educated (Franke/Shah, 2003). Our 
sample consisted of undergraduate and graduate 
students from two information systems courses 
related to SAP, as well as research assistants from the 
same field at a large German university. 405 
participants took part in the experiment and 323 were 
included in the analysis. Subjects that did not 
complete the survey and/or performed two or less 
trades were removed from the analysis as they did not 
perform the given trading task adequately. In order to 
motivate the participants, we offered homework 
credit points for students and drew two mp3 players 
for the subjects with the highest trading performance 
(Slamka et al., 2012). Such rank-order tournament 
payout schemes were found to enhance accuracy of 
PMs (Luckner/Weinhardt, 2007). We considered 
students of the selected SAP courses and information 
system experts to be appropriate subjects for this 
study because the experimental task required 
knowledge of SAP systems. It can also be argued that 
IS students are suitable participants, as they represent 
actual users of OI communities. We applied 
Multivariate Analysis of Variance in order to check 
random assignment, and found no differences 
regarding age, gender, and education. There were no 
differences between students and research assistants. 
75.9% of our subjects were male, 5.9% had a master 
degree, 26.3% a bachelor degree and 60.4% finished 
high school. Mean age was 22.37 years. 
Idea Sample 
The ideas to be evaluated in the experiment 
comprised of a title and a description. The ideas were 
taken from a German real-world OI community of 
the software producer SAP. In this community, SAP 
users are invited to submit innovative ideas to 
improve the SAP software. Currently, it consists of 
314 users who have submitted 218 ideas varying in 
length between a half and full A4 page. An 
independent panel of experts evaluated all ideas. 
Among all ideas, idea quality is normally distributed 
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z-score: 0.56, p = 0.91). 
Since conducting an experiment with all ideas 
implied a substantial workload a stratified sample of 
24 ideas was drawn. This sample comprised 8 ideas 
each with high, medium, and low quality. The sample 
size was considered sufficient, as 20 to 30 ideas are 
generally used to measure the variance of creativity 
ratings of laypersons (Runco/Basadur, 1993). 
Data Sources  
The triangulation of behavioral experiment data, and 
an expert rating of idea quality helps to gain more 
robust results overcoming common method bias. 
Behavioral Experiment Data 
The 323 participants performed 12583 transactions. 
On average, each user performed 38.9 transactions in 
93 minutes. We defined trading performance as sum 
of their disposable cash and their payouts at the 
market end. We normalized this with the mean 
number of transactions per market as the absolute 
number of contracts per market varied on base of the 
market design.  
Expert Rating 
In practice, companies evaluate innovation ideas with 
small expert groups (Urban/Hauser, 1993, Girotra et 
al., 2010). Accordingly, experts are generally used 
for identifying the most promising ideas in OI 
communities (Piller/Walcher, 2006). Expert 
evaluations provide a proxy measure for actual idea 
quality, which is not observable. Thus, we compared 
the subjects’ transaction with an independent expert 
evaluation in order to assess their trading 
performance. Our idea sample was evaluated by a 
jury using the consensual assessment technique 
(Amabile, 1996). This technique has been used for 
evaluating user-generated innovation ideas before 
(Piller/Walcher, 2006). The jury consisted of 11 
referees, who were either professors in information 
systems, employees of SAP’s marketing and R&D 
department, or the SAP University Competence 
Centers. Idea quality was measured with four items 
that are internally used by SAP and reflect the 
dimensions of novelty, relevance, feasibility, and 
elaboration as used by Blohm (2011). For evaluation, 
the idea descriptions were copied into separate 
evaluation forms which were randomized and 
contained the scales for idea evaluation as well. The 
referees were assigned to rate the ideas with the four 
items on a rating scale from 1 (lowest) to 5 (highest) 
independently from the other referees with the given 
forms. We assessed the Intra-Class-Correlation-
Coefficients (ICC) of the expert evaluations that 
should exceed the value of 0.7 (Amabile, 1996). We 
considered this as met for all items excluding 
feasibility whose ICC was 0.5 for which ICCs tend to 
be very low (Amabile, 1996). Based on the mean 
quality scores of the ideas, we calculated an 
aggregated quality ranking. 
RESULTS 
Market level analysis  
In order to test the performance of our markets, we 
firstly analyzed their accuracy on an aggregated level 
(cf. Table 2). We checked whether there is a 
significant concurrence between the markets and the 
experts, calculating Kendall-Tau rank-order 
correlations, and Mean Absolute Percentage Errors 
(MAPE) (Armstrong/Collopy, 1992) using the 
ranking of ideas according to their final prices at the 
end of the trading period as well as the ranking of the 
ideas deriving from the expert evaluation. For multi-
markets, we used the prices for top contracts. MAPE 
is the most widely used measure for evaluating the 
accuracy of forecasts in time series analysis and 
offers good validity. We used the placement numbers 
of the market ranking (forecast ranking) and the 
expert ranking (actual ranking) for calculating the 
MAPE (cf. Formula 1). The MAPE thus compares 
the results of the market outcome with the expert 
rating. The smaller the MAPE is, the smaller is the 
market’s deviation from the experts. 
 

MAPE 
1
n
actual ranking of ideat  forecast ranking of ideat
actual ranking of ideatt1
n
  
Formula 1: Mean Absolute Percentage Error 
 
Generally, the markets tend to correlate stronger 
among each other than with the expert evaluation. 
This indicates that they produce quite similar idea 
rankings. However, the multi-market design with 
moderate price elasticity (PM5) has the highest 
correlation (p < 0.05), and the third lowest MAPE, 
only slightly above the smallest MAPE (9%). PM3 
seems to be the most accurate market in terms of 
MAPE. However, it does not significantly correlate 
with the expert evaluation so that we consider PM5 
as the most accurate market.  
 
 Single-Market Design Multi-Market Design 
Price 
Elasticity 
High 
(PM1) 
Medium 
(PM2) 
Low 
(PM3) 
High 
(PM4) 
Medium 
(PM5) 
Low 
(PM6) 
PM1 -- 0,29* 0.49** 0.47** 0.49** 0.27 
PM2  -- 0.29* 0.38* 0.37** 0.05* 
PM3   -- 0.44** 0.37** 0.21** 
PM4    -- 0.52** 0.30* 
PM5     -- 0.19* 
Experts -0.01 0.14 0.22 0.02 0.33* 0.03 
MAPE 1.77 1.79 1.22 1.89 1.31 1.24 
*significant with p < 0.05; **significant with p < 0.01 
Table 2: Market Level Analysis  
Hypothesis Testing 
According to Kamis et al (2008) we applied Partial 
Least Square (PLS) analysis using SmartPLS 2.0 for 
testing our research model. We operationalized the 
experimental conditions as dummy variables. Given 
the three levels of price elasticity, we created two 
dummies variables applying the coding scheme of 
Kamis et al. (2008). Thus, price elasticity dummy 1 
(PE Dummy 1) reflects the decrease from a high to a 
moderate price elasticity setting, and price elasticity 
dummy 2 the decrease from moderate to low 
respectively  (PE Dummy 2). For testing the 
moderating effect of price elasticity, we calculated 
two interaction terms multiplying each of the two 
price elasticity dummies with the market design 
dummy. The results are shown in Table 3. We tested 
H1 in step 1 in which the interaction terms were not 
included. The coefficient for the market design 
dummy is positive and significant (β = 0.26; p < 
0.01). As the single-market design served as 
reference group, this implies that multi-market 
designs lead to higher trading performance of users. 
Thus, H1 was supported. Additionally, no significant 
main effect of price elasticity on trading performance 
was detected. In step 2 we added he interaction terms 
in our model. Both resulting interaction terms are 
significant with p < 0.05 indicating a significant 
moderation effect. The coefficient for interaction 
term 1 is positive (β = 0.23), whereas interaction term 
2 has a negative coefficient (β = -0.18).  
 
 Step 1 Step 2 
Market Design 0.262** 0.173* 
PE Dummy 1 -0.080 0.032 
PE Dummy 2 0.024 -0.093* 
PE Dummy 1 X Market Design  0.227 
PE Dummy 2 X Market Design  -0.178 
R² 0,069 0,083 
*significant with p < 0.05; **significant with p < 0.01 
Table 2: Results of PLS analysis  
 
To probe these results we graphed the estimated 
means in Figure 2. Whereas trading performance is 
merely affected by price elasticity on single-markets, 
trading performance follows an inverted u-shape on 
multi-markets. Thus the performance difference 
between the two market designs is highest with a 
moderate price elasticity. Thus, H2 was supported. 
 
 
Figure 2: Estimated means of trading performance 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Our results suggest that multi-market designs lead to 
significantly higher market performance than single-
market designs and that price elasticity has only a 
very limited influence on trading performance of PM 
users on the single-market design. By contrast, the 
effect of price elasticity on multi-markets is far 
bigger. On these markets, trading performance 
follows an inverted u-shape. Decreasing price 
elasticity from high to moderate levels increases 
trading performance significantly in the first instance 
whereas it significantly drops when price elasticity is 
further diminished to the low elasticity treatment. On 
average, the multi-market design is 11% more 
accurate than the single-market design. If moderate 
price elasticity is considered, this effect rises to 48%. 
Although the accuracy of prediction markets for idea 
evaluation can be significantly enhanced using the 
multi-market design, their evaluation error is quite 
high. However, the correlation of our market with the 
expert evaluations is in the range reported by other 
researchers of 0.43 (LaComb et al., 2007) and of 
0.10, 0.39 and 0.47 (Soukhoroukova et al., 2012).  
 
From a theoretical perspective, our work contributes 
to the growing body of literature on the design on 
PMs (e.g., Wolfers/Zitzewitz, 2004, 
Luckner/Weinhardt, 2007), in particular in the 
domain of idea evaluation. Our work is, to our 
knowledge, a first-ever experimental analysis of two 
key factors influencing the performance of PMs for 
idea evaluation: their fundamental market design 
(single-markets vs. multi-markets) and price 
elasticity. Our work shows how these fundamental 
mechanics interact and how they affect trading 
performance of PM users. Existing research suggests 
that PMs work well as long as traders understand the 
contracts they are supposed to trade 
(Wolfers/Zitzewitz, 2004). Our research extends this 
existing line of research and suggests that appropriate 
market and contract design helps PM users to 
distinguish more exactly between the different 
properties of the tradable contracts, and equally 
important, to express these judgments adequately on 
the PM. Our research suggests that multi-markets are 
more apt to meet this conditions than single-markets 
and that they are most effective in settings of 
moderate price elasticity. In these conditions, the 
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benefits of multi-markets are amplified as traders get 
appropriate system feedback stimulating their trading 
performance. From a practical perspective, our 
research helps practitioners to set up PMs for idea 
evaluation and more general for contracts describing 
vague concepts whose occurrence in future is 
uncertain. While practitioners are drawn more and 
more to the concept of PMs, many details necessary 
to successfully operate markets fur such type of 
goods are still unavailable. Our work suggests 
actionable design guidelines that should facilitate 
application of PMs. In this vein, we suggest to use 
multi-market designs or design PMs in such manner 
that traders are provided with sufficient alternatives 
for each trading decision. Additionally, we suggest a 
moderate price elasticity. In this regard, we were able 
to verify the work of Berg/Proebsting (2009) that is 
useful for calibrating the LMSR market maker.  
 
Some general limitations of controlled experiments 
apply to our research. While our web-experiment was 
intended to closely reflect community behavior, 
general threats to the external validity may result 
from the use of students. The expert rating might be 
deficient, although experts generally outperform non-
experts (see Ericsson/Lehmann, 1996 for a review). 
Experts might be more prone to a fixed mind-set 
rather than a broader community, and thus certain 
aspects of some ideas might have been overlooked. 
However, as true idea quality is not directly 
observable, assessment of idea quality through 
experts is generally performed for idea selection. The 
true value of an idea could be considered as the 
idea’s net present value if a value maximizing 
strategy is pursed (Girotra et al., 2010). However, 
even after market introduction it can take several 
years until this value can be determined for a given 
product (Beardsley/Mansfield, 1978), so that its 
determination is always associated with high 
uncertainty as ideas initially submitted in OI 
communities often merely resemble the final 
products that have been developed from them. 
Additionally, the success of products is determined 
by many different factors beyond idea quality, e.g., 
the marketing strategy of the focal company. Thus, 
the accuracy of PMs for idea evaluation resembles 
the correlation with the community operator’s idea 
selection decisions for a given idea (Kamp/Koen, 
2009), that our expert evaluation was intended to 
approximate. Even when accepting expert judgments 
as biased, our results retain their validity. Experts are 
a scarce and valuable resource with limited time. 
Consequently, using experts for continuously 
assessing the quality of ideas is expensive. In OI 
communities a high magnitude of innovation ideas is 
submitted that cannot be reviewed by experts as it 
would exceed their resources. Thus, well calibrated 
PMs can be used to reduce the workload for experts 
in terms of pre-selection of ideas or even replace the 
expert panel. Moreover, PMs for idea evaluation 
suffer from the fact that no real outcome exists, to 
which payoffs can be tied. This makes additional 
payout schemes as researched by Slamka et al. (2012) 
necessary that perform equally well as expert 
evaluations.  
 
Our study shows how two fundamental mechanics 
influence the functioning of PMs for idea evaluation. 
Comparable studies should be replicated in other 
domains with other types of traded goods. Moreover, 
our research implies that the used PM designs are 
perceived cognitively different and these perceptions 
highly influenced the markets’ outcome. Thus, a 
more indulgent understanding of user cognitions is 
necessary to design more powerful PMs. In this 
regard, future research should especially consider the 
decision process of traders. Understanding this 
process, markets can be tailored to deliver higher 
decision support and better market performance. The 
combination of quantitative and qualitative prediction 
tools may be a further fruitful avenue for research 
(Mühlbacher et al., 2011). 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
This research received funding through the GENIE 
project by the German Ministry of Research and 
Education (BMBF) under contract No. FKZ 
01FM07027 and the German Ministry of Economics 
and Technology (BMWi) under grant code 
01MQ07024. The second author also acknowledges 
supported by the German Research Foundation under 
grant code RI 2185/1-1.  
REFERENCES 
Amabile, T.M. (1996), "Creativity in context. Update 
to social psychology of creativity", Oxford, 
Westview Press. 
Armstrong, J.S. and Collopy, F. (1992), "Error 
measures for generalizing about forecasting 
methods: Empirical comparisons ". 
International Journal of Forecasting, 8, 69-
80. 
Beardsley, G. and Mansfield, E. (1978), "A Note on 
the Accuracy of Industrial Forecasts of the 
Profitability of New Products and 
Processes". Journal of Business, 51, 127-
135. 
Berg, H. and Proebsting, T.A. (2009), "Hanson's 
Automated Market Maker". The Journal of 
Prediction Markets, 3, 45-59. 
Blohm, I., Riedl, C., Leimeister, J.M. and Krcmar, H. 
(2011) Idea Evaluation Mechanisms for 
Collective Intelligence in Open Innovation 
Communities: Do Traders Outperform 
Raters? 2011 International Conference on 
Information Systems. Shanghai, China, AIS. 
Bothos, E., Apostolou, D. and Mentzas, G. (2009), 
"Collective intelligence for idea 
management with Internet-based 
information aggregation markets". Internet 
Research, 19, 26-41. 
Chen, L., Goes, P., Marsden, J.R. and Zhang, Z. 
(2009-10), "Design and use of preference 
markets for evaluation of early stage 
technologies". Journal of Management 
Information Systems, 26, 45-70. 
Chesbrough, H.W. (2003), "The era of open 
innovation". MIT Sloan Management 
Review, 44, 35-41. 
Dahan, E., Soukhoroukova, A. and Spann, M. (2010), 
"New Product Developement 2.0: 
Preference Markets How Scalable Securities 
Markets Identify Winning Product Concepts 
& Attributes". Journal of Product 
Innovation Management, 27, 937-954. 
Ericsson, K.A. and Lehmann, A.C. (1996), "Experts 
an exceptional performance: evidence of 
maximal adaption to task constraints". 
Annual Review of Psychology, 47, 273-305. 
Fama, E.F. (1970), "Efficient Capital Markets: A 
Review of Theory and Empirical Work". 
The Journal of Finance, 25, 383-417. 
Franke, N. and Shah, S. (2003), "How communities 
support innovative activities: an exploration 
of assistance and sharing among end-users". 
Research Policy, 32, 157-178. 
Gaspoz, C. and Pigneur, Y. (2008) Preparing a 
Negotiated R&D Portfolio with a Prediction 
Market. 41st Hawaii International 
Conference on System Science (HICCS 41). 
Waikoloa, Big Island, Hawaii, USA. 
Girotra, K., Terwiesch, C. and Ulrich, K.T. (2010), 
"Idea Generation and the Quality of the Best 
Idea". Management Science, 56, 591-605. 
Hanson, R. (2003), "Combinatorial Information 
Market Design". Information Systems 
Frontiers, 5, 107-119. 
Hayek, F.A. (1945), "The Use of Knowledge in 
Society". American Economic Review, 35, 
519-530. 
Howe, J. (2008), "Crowdsourcing: Why the power of 
the crowd is driving the future of business", 
New York, Crown Publishing Group. 
Jian, L. and Sami, R. (2012), "Aggregation and 
manipulation in prediction markets: effects 
of trading mechanism and information 
distribution". Management Science, 
forthcoming. 
Kamis, A., Koufaris, M. and Stern, T. (2008), "Using 
an attribute-based decision support system 
for user-customized products online: An 
experimental Investigation". MIS Quarterly, 
32, 158-177. 
Kamp, G. and Koen, P.A. (2009), "Improving the 
Idea Screening Process within Organizations 
using Prediction Markets: A Theoretical 
Perspective". The Journal of Prediction 
Markets, 3, 39-64. 
Lacomb, A.C., Barnett, A. and Qimei, P. (2007), 
"The imagination market". Information 
Systems Frontiers, 9, 245-256. 
Luckner, S. and Weinhardt, C. (2007), "How to Pay 
Traders in Information Markets: Results 
from a Field Experiment". The Journal of 
Prediction Markets, 1, 147-156. 
Mühlbacher, H., Füller, J. and Huber, L. (2011), 
"Online Forum Discussion-Based 
Forecasting of New Product Market 
Performance". Marketing ZfP, 33, 221-234. 
Pennock, D.M. and Sami, R. (2008), "Computational 
Aspects of Prediction Markets". Algorithmic 
game theory. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press. 
Piller, F.T. and Walcher, D. (2006), "Toolkits for 
idea competitions: a novel method to 
integrate users in new product 
development". R&D Management, 36, 307-
318. 
Runco, M.A. and Basadur, M. (1993), "Assessing 
Ideational and Evaluative Skills and 
Creative Styles and Attitudes". Creativity 
and Innovation Management, 2, 166-173. 
Slamka, C., Jank, W. and Skiera, B. (2012), "Second-
Generation Prediction Markets for 
Information Aggregation: A Comparison of 
Payoff Mechanisms". Journal of 
Forecasting, forthcoming. 
Snowberg, E. and Wolfers, J. (2010), "Explaining the 
Favorite–Long Shot Bias: Is it Risk-Love or 
Misperceptions?". Journal of Political 
Economy, 118, 723-746. 
Soukhoroukova, A., Spann, M. and Skiera, B. (2012), 
"Sourcing, Filtering, and Evaluating New 
Product Ideas: An Empirical Exploration of 
the Performance of Idea Markets". Journal 
of Product Innovation Management, 29, 
100-112. 
Urban, G.L. and Hauser, J.R. (1993), "Design and 
Marketing of New Products", Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ/USA, Prentice Hall. 
Wolfers, J. and Zitzewitz, E. (2004), "Prediction 
Markets". Journal of Economic Perspective, 
18, 107-126. 
 
 
